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Abstract—The e-Pedigree used for verifying the authenticity 
of the products in RFID-enabled product supply chains plays a 
very important role in product anti-counterfeiting and risk 
management, but it is also vulnerable to malicious attacks and 
privacy leakage. While the radio frequency identification (RFID) 
technology bears merits such as automatic wireless identification 
without direct eye-sight contact, its security has been one of the 
main concerns in recent researches such as tag data tampering 
and cloning. Moreover, privacy leakage of the partners along the 
supply chains may lead to complete compromise of the whole 
system, and in consequence all authenticated products may be 
replaced by the faked ones! Quite different from other 
conventional databases, datasets in supply chain scenarios are 
temporally correlated, and every party of the system can only be 
semi-trusted. In this paper, a system that incorporates merits of 
both the secure multi-party computing and differential privacy is 
proposed to address the security and privacy issues, focusing on 
the vulnerability analysis of the data mining with distributed 
EPCIS datasets of e-pedigree having temporal relations from 
multiple range and aggregate queries in typical supply chain 
scenarios and the related algorithms. Theoretical analysis shows 
that our proposed system meets perfectly our preset design goals, 
while some of the other problems leave for future research. 
Keywords—supply chain; e-pedigree; multi-party security; anti-
counterfeiting; differential privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Counterfeiting has been growing greatly in the decade and 
penetrating into various industries such as food, drugs, high-
tech products and luxury goods by altering or misrepresenting 
an individual product for economic gain, shaking the public 
confidence in the ability of manufacturers and governments to 
assure the safety of food and other products [1-3]. With the 
merits of the radio frequency identification (RFID) technology 
such as automatic wireless identification without direct eye-
sight contact, the e-pedigree of RFID-enabled supply chain has 
been taken as the promising tool of anti-counterfeiting and 
brand protection by tracking and/or tracing the historical 
movement of the specific product. It can be authenticated at 
each node of the supply chain for data consistence with those 
pre-stored in the EPC information system (EPCIS) repositories 
[4-6], according to the architecture specified by EPCglobal [7], 
an organization dedicated to promote the global standardization 
of the electronic product code (EPC) that is used to uniquely 
identify single products. 
By EPCglobal standard of pedigree 1.0 released in 2007 [8], 
a pedigree is a certified record that contains information about 
each distribution of the product to be protected. It records the 
sale of an item by a manufacturer, any acquisitions and sales 
by authenticated wholesalers or distributors, and final sale to a 
customer who buys this product. The pedigree contains 
information about the product, transaction, authenticated 
distributor, the recipients, and related signatures. 
The typical scene of e-pedigree processing can be simply 
modeled as the iterative two-party protocol between two sides 
from the manufacturers to the customers: one is the sender who 
distributes the product, while the other is the product recipient. 
The typical UML sequence diagram of e-pedigree flow can be 
illustrated in Fig.1. 
Fig. 1. UML sequence of e-pedigree flow: note that the product is manually 
verified with authentication of the respective transactions 
After the recipient signed the pedigree, the ownership is 
then transferred, and its identity will be changed into the sender, 
and next shipping process starts. 
The typical implementation of this system assumes the 
following requirements: each node of the supply chain 
maintains and updates its local EPCIS with EPC data and the 
related events connected to their e-pedigrees, which can also 
provide  some more advanced services of range and aggregate 
queries via internet for further inference or sales promotion 
support under the EPCglobal networked framework. Even if all 
nodes of the supply chain are authenticated and trustworthy 
according to the law, it has been shown and reported in many 
literatures that such queries from distributed sources with 
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outputs of “true answers” or even some of the intermediate 
data mining reports may result in privacy leakage of individual 
records [9]. Since any product has to move from one to another 
before it arrives at the hand of the final buyer, its relevant 
historical records must be shared by those intermediate nodes. 
And at least partial information of one node are always shared 
by its several neighboring nodes. 
The challenge is obvious: if privacy leakage due to data 
mining of the information service released datasets occurs at 
any time, the attacker will get the information of the specific 
product, and further compromise the X.509 based signature, 
and the e-pedigree will then be compromised. Besides, the 
RFID tags also suffer many security vulnerabilities. 
Quite different from other conventional databases, datasets 
in supply chain scenarios are temporally correlated, and every 
party of the system can only be semi-trusted. To address this 
problem in this paper, a system that incorporates merits of both 
the secure multi-party computing [10] and differential privacy 
[11] is proposed, focusing on the vulnerability analysis of the 
data mining with distributed EPCIS datasets of e-pedigree 
having temporal relations from multiple range and aggregate 
queries in typical supply chain scenarios and the related 
algorithms. 
The paper is organized as follows: Next the related work 
and the background is discussed, including the potential 
vulnerabilities and threats, the multiparty security computing 
protocol and differential privacy. Then our problems are 
carefully formulated in section III. Our proposed system is 
presented and theoretically analyzed along with key issues of 
its implementation in section IV. It is concluded in section V. 
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Typical system architecture of a product supply chain can 
be illustrated in Fig.2. 
Fig. 2. Typical system architecture of a product supply chain 
The products are first manufactured by specific producers 
and attached with respective RFID tags whose data will be read 
out and stored in the EPCIS databases. As mentioned above, 
the e-pedigree will be created, filled with its respective data, 
signed and stored simultaneously into the EPCIS databases. 
Then along with the products entering into another node of the 
supply chain, a supplier, or a distributor during the shipment, 
the receiver of the products after the RFID tags data of the 
products automatically read and sanitized and finally stored 
into the  EPCIS databases, will manually examine the products 
and authenticate the e-pedigree as shown in Fig.1. Then the e-
pedigree will be authenticated and signed again to guarantee 
the consistence of the actual objects with their respective data. 
This process repeats until the products arrive at the hands of 
the buyer, when the e-pedigree received can be acted as the 
certificate of the authenticity. 
A. E-pedigree verification process with a centrilised TTP 
Based on the above-stated background, the typical process 
for e-pedigree verification via a centralized TTP can be shown 
by its UML sequence diagram of message flow in Fig.3. 
Fig. 3. UML sequence diagram of message flow for e-pedigree verification 
B. Data queries for data mining 
There are generally two types of data mining tasks in this 
system: one of the data mining task is called exception 
detection, the objectivity of which is to extract the normal 
patterns of the events’ activities when the product moves from 
the producer to the buyer by data mining, and capture the point 
when exceptions are detected, so that the risk of threats from 
daily working fallacy or counterfeiting intentions can be 
greatly reduced [12]. 
Another task of the data mining in the system is for each 
node of the supply chain to discover its knowledge of some 
type of products from the daily, weekly, monthly and even 
yearly counting statistics, which helps to support decision 
making of specific networking node in its marketing promotion 
and internal management. 
Both types of data mining tasks have shared some data 
features in common. 
Dynamic: products of same type enter and exit to the same 
node are continuously updating, therefore, if products of a type 
are found in a fixed number for a relatively persistent period, 
there is supposed to be an exception. 
Coocurrence: Products in the warehouse of a node are 
usually dependent due to in the same pallet, package. In fact, 
useful knowledge could be discovered on this relationship. 
This feature is also described as its spatial relationship. 
Connections: Links between the prior node and the next 
node of a product plays important role on enhancing the 
cooperative relationship among the neighboring nodes, based 
on the knowledge of their link statistics. This feature is called 
the temporal relationship of the product. 
Sensitivity: Both types are dealing with sensitive data, and 
the results including the intermediate results of the data mining 
might influence the leakage of the privacy. 
Similarly, Both types of data mining tasks have their 
special features that make them different from each. 
Purpose: the purposes for both types of data mining are 
different because the first one is trying to detect the exceptions 
so that the e-pedigree can be authenticated with high degree of 
trust, instead the second type is to find out the normal relations 
between different strategies so that the efficiency and benefits 
of the business can be improved with the knowledge. 
Spread: The range that the data spread in both types is 
significantly different. The first type requires nearly all data in 
all nodes taken into consideration, while the second type only 
requires that within its node. 
Parties: The computation of the first type is a multi-party 
computing, while the second type can do it by each node. 
Therefore, they make a big difference in considering security 
and privacy. 
C. Potential vulanerbilities and threats 
Potential vulnerabilities and threats related to the business 
processing of the RFID-enabled product supply chain are well 
studied in [12], which are summarized as shown in Fig.4. 
Fig. 4. Classification of node-based potential vulnerabilities and threats 
However, there are potential vulnerabilities and threats 
related to the data release of the data mining or knowledge 
discovery. The main concern related to the data mining is the 
privacy preserving, which is deeply intrigued with security 
issues. 
Since the RFID tags can also be read by unknown party 
nearby with more powerful readers, if the links connected with 
those tags are disclosed by such data mining process, then the 
related e-pedigrees, even in their encrypted format, are under 
the threat of known plaintext-cyphertext pair, which is very 
easy to be compromised. 
Therefore, more sophisticated scheme should be proposed 
to address this challenging issue that combining security with 
privacy. In this paper, we propose a system that combines 
secure multiparty computing with differential privacy to 
address this issue, and theoretically prove its effectiveness. 
D. Secure Multiparty Computing protocols 
There are scenarios of data mining when the data is divided 
among two or more different parties and the aim being to run a 
data mining algorithm on the union of the parties’ databases 
without allowing any party to view another individual’s private 
data [13,14,15]. This might happen between untrusted financial 
organizations who plan to cooperatively work on a project for 
their mutual benefit without disclosing their private 
requirements, or even among competitors who want to know 
whether their regions overlap without giving away their private 
location information. Secure multiparty computing protocol is 
designed for this purpose. 
A simple implementation of this protocol can be achieved 
with two separate processing layers: one layer as the trusted 
third party (TTP) is responsible for the joint computation for 
the datasets collected separately from the other parties, while 
the other layer is responsible for the secret data exchange 
between the TTP and each of the parties who needs the result 
of the computation from the TTP under the framework of PKI 
infrastructure. 
Each party including TTP maintains initially two keys: one 
is the secret key, the other the public key. Then they need to 
exchange for each other’s public key. The secure computing 
starts after that. As we can prove, each party shares its secret 
data with TTP, the later after collecting the data from all the 
parties, generates the computation results and secretly feedback 
to each party. 
This simple implementation only considers one TTP which 
might be not so trustworthy. For instance, the sever that the 
TTP runs may be corrupted by the adversaries, and the whole 
system then be compromised afterwards. 
Mishra et al. [13] proposed an extended encrypto_random 
(EER algorithm) to address this problem. Their algorithm can 
be rewritten and illustrated as follows: 
Inputs: ଵܲǡ ଶܲǡ ڮ ǡ ୬ܲ as parties; D as function pool;ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ڮ ǡ ୬݂ as encrypting functions;௙ܴ  as a randomization function
Step 1: for party ଵܲto ୬ܲ do
Break data block into packets for ௜ܲ :ሺ ௜ܲܭଵǡ ௜ܲܭଶǡ ڮ ǡ ௜ܲܭ௥ሻ
Step 2:  Select ୨݂  from D, and compute the encrypting
values for each packet: ଵܸǡ ଶܸǡ ڮ ǡ ୰ܸ.
Step 3:     Compute ௜ܵ௞ ൌ ௜ܲܭ௞ ൅ ௞ܸ ௝݂;
 /* where, k denotes the index of specific packet */ 
Step 4:  for i=1 to n, do 
 for k=1 to r, do 
send ௜ܵ௞ randomly to  ௜ܲ;
Step 5:  Choose TTP by using ௙ܴ;
Step 6: for i=1 to n, do 
send ௜ܵ௞ to TTP chosen;
Step 7: TTP decodes ௜ܵ௞  using ୨݂  from D; and rearrange           ௜ܲܭ௞ into data blocks;
Step 8: TTP computes and announces result to each party. 
Since each party doesn’t know what encrypting function 
may be selected, the privacy for each party can be preserved 
from each other, while TTP with knowledge of these functions 
can easily reassemble the data packets to form the whole data 
blocks, but in no case can relate any data block thus formed to 
the certain party. 
However, this protocol has obvious limitations too. In 
many scenarios of product supply chains the neighboring nodes 
have shared data, since in the above-stated protocol these 
shared data after reassembly by TTP are expressed in their 
plaintext format, therefore, it is easy for TTP to disclose. 
One powerful tool of cryptography in dealing with this kind 
of problem is the famous Paillier encryption scheme [14] based 
on the following homo-morphic properties. 
Let ܧ௣௞ be the encrypting function with public key pk given
by (N,g), where N is a product of two large primes and g is a 
generator in Ժ୒మכ ; And let ܦ௦௞ be the encrypting function with
secret key sk. Given two plaintexts x, yא Ժ୒, then we have:
Homomorphic addition: ܧ௣௞ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻ ՚ ܧ௣௞ሺݔሻ כ ܧ௣௞ሺݕሻܰଶ;
Homomorphic multiplication: ܧ௣௞ሺݔ כ ݕሻ ՚ ܧ௣௞ሺݔሻ௬ܰଶ;
Semantic security:  this scheme is shown semantically 
secure [15]. In other words, no additional information about the 
plaintexts can be deducted from a set of ciphertexts given. 
Since all information processed in TTP are in their cipher 
format, even if TTP can reassemble the data blocks from each 
party and compute them as a whole to generate the expected 
results for each party, it is unable to disclose any information 
that is referred to any specific party, not to mention its relation. 
E. Differential privacy 
Scenarios of product supply chains are too complicated to 
just use such protocols to achieve sound security and privacy at 
the same time. In fact, for each node of the supply chain, it is 
its duty to promote its services and release some of its counting 
statistics to the public. Obviously, all these data reported in 
public could not be encrypted, which makes the auxiliary data 
known to the malicious adversaries. 
A paradigm called “differential privacy” was first proposed 
in 2003 by researchers collaborated as a team such as Dinur, 
Nissim, and Dwork [16,17], which is completely different from 
the conventional ways on that it concerns nothing about the 
sensitive data but the feature of the existence of the data, which 
can be easily formulized in mathematics as follows[17,18]: 
As briefly described in [18], A randomized function K 
gives ¦ -differential privacy if for all data sets x and x’ 
differing on at most one element, and all ܵ ك ሺܭሻ,
Pr[K(x)אS]exp(¦)×Prሾܭሺݔᇱሻ א ܵሿ
Therefore, when¦is a small number, the probabilities for 
both data sets x and x’ are indistinguishable, so that the 
difference between both data sets  is unable to be leaked. 
¦-differential privacy can be achieved by adding a random 
noise whose magnitude is chosen as a function of the largest 
change a single participant could have on the output to the 
query function. This quantity which determines the noise 
magnitude is called “sensitivity of the query function” [18]: 
For a query function ݂ǣ ܦ ՜ ܴௗ, the L1-sensitivity of f isȟ݂ ൌ ஽భǡ஽మԡ݂ሺܦଵሻ െ ݂ሺܦଶሻԡଵ
for all ܦଵ, ܦଶ differing on at most one element.
Then the noise of scaled symmetric exponential distribution 
with variance ɐଶ can be determined by lettingɐ ൒ Ԗ ȟ݂ൗ [19].
This sounds very good philosophy of privacy preserving, 
and even more, McSherry and Talwar [20] extends¦ -
differential privacy to cases when the output is not easily 
“perturbed” with noise by a utility function ݑሺܺǡ ݕሻ  that
measures the quality of an output y for data sets X. It is shown 
that y is output with probability proportional to 
expሺെԖݑሺܺǡ ݕሻȀʹሻ , which ensures Ԗȟ-differential privacy, orԖ -differential privacy wheneverȟݑ ൑ ͳ. Here ȟݑis defined as
the maximum possible change to the value of u caused by 
changing the data of a single row instead of removing or 
adding a row. This so-called “exponential mechanism”, 
addresses privacy preserving for structured data sets and/or 
strategy data sets. 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
A. Data types for data mining queries 
There are several different problems that have to be solved, 
which will be formulated respectively in this section. 
The datasets for queries that the data mining process want 
to draw can be classified as the following different data types: 
Data type I: Since e-pedigree of a product records its 
history of movement from the manufacturer to the buyer, the 
basic pathways of its shipment or traffic based on its spatial 
relations (locations) and temporal relations (the order when 
those locations are passed) builds up the pattern for the 
producer to transfer its product to the consumers. There do 
exist some variations in the middle when some special events 
occur with reasonable interpretations. While exceptions of the 
pattern are detected without reasonable interpretations, some 
attacks are thus detected. 
For data mining the data type I, the basic dataset is the 
temporal set of locations for the product (denoted with its epc), 
which makes very instance of a pathway for a specific epc. It 
can be expected that for the same producer and buyer, 
collections of datasets for similar epcs can be used for data 
mining this normal pattern, which can be used for exception 
detection without reasonable interpretations. More formally, 
Let ۲۷ be a set of tuples, ൛൫݁݌ܿ௜ ǡ ݈݋ ௝ܿ ǡ ݐ௞൯ȁ݅ǡ ݆ǡ ݇ א Ժൟ, where ݐ௞
denotes a continuous time period from the startpoint when the 
epc of the product is generated and written into the RFID tag 
attached to it to the endpoint when the buyer authenticates 
his/her receiving the product, and i, j, k, are used to distinguish 
the relevant epc, location and time. 
Sometimes when the above-stated data mining results are 
inconsistent with the flexibility of daily operations, there are 
too many exceptions with reasonable interpretations, reducing 
the working efficiency as a whole. In this case, local patterns 
can help for improvement. 
Similarly, the data type is also composed of a collection of 
tuples, (epc, loc, t), in a limited continuous time period. That is 
to say, suppose ݐ଴ be the time when the epc of the product is
generated, ݐ௡  be the time when the buyer receives and
authenticates the product, then  א  ؿ ሾ଴ǡ ୬ሿ.
To put these situations into considerations together, we 
should formulize our expression of ۲۷ into more generalized
form as follows: ࡰࡵ ؔ ൛൫݁݌ܿ௜ ǡ ݈݋ ௝ܿ ǡ ݐ௞൯ȁ݅ǡ ݆ǡ ݇ א Ժǡ ݐ௞ ك ሾ଴ǡ ୬ሿൟ
A sample dataset of data type I is shown in Table I: 
TABLE I. A SAMPLE DATASET OF DATA TYPE I 
Epc code  Loc_id T_entry T_exit 
1.2.3.4 12101 2015-07-13 13:55 2015-07-14 09:15
1.2.3.4 12102 2015-07-14 15:30 2015-07-15 03:45
1.2.3.4 12103 2015-07-15 10:20 2015-07-15 20:50
1.2.3.4 12104 2015-07-16 17:30 2015-07-25 06:50
1.2.3.4 12105 2015-07-27 18:30 2015-09-10 14:20
According to EPCglobal standard, the epc code can be 
designed as a 96-bit code which basically includes the 
manufacturer_id, product_id, product_type, and product’s 
serial number.  
For easy understanding of the problem that might be 
encountered in typical RFID-enabled product supply chain 
scenarios, a simple sample location coding table for loc_id is 
illustrated in Table II. 
TABLE II. A SAMPLE LOCATION CODING TABLE 
Loc_id Loc_name owner 
12101 Production Line E  Manufacturer J  
12102 Warehouse B  Supplier K  
12103 Shipping Port A  Carrier G  
12104 Shipping Port F Carrier G 
12105 Retailer Store C  Retailer C 
By both Table I and II, the movement of product with its 96 
bits’ epc of 1.2.3.4 can be semantically interpreted. 
Data type II: Usually each node does the work of data 
mining to improve its management and optimize its marketing 
strategies, some knowledge of which needs to be discovered 
this way. 
From the viewpoint of a supply chain node manager, the 
most frequently asked questions should be: “which links make 
the most profitable part of our business?”, “which type of 
packages takes the shortest time and which type the longest 
time?”, “what is the statistics of those products?”, and so on. 
The answers of these questions are of range or aggregate 
queries of the related datasets. 
For each node of the supply chain, it receives products from 
different sources, and sends them to the designated different 
destinations.  For simplicity, it can be assumed that each node 
has the link information of the product that can explicitly 
express its previous and next location. Let ݈݋ܿԢ be the previous
location, ݈݋̶ܿ be the next location, this type of datasets can be
defined as ۲۷۷:ࡰࡵࡵ ؔ ሼሺ݁݌ܿ௜ ǡ ݈݋ܿԢ௜ ǡ ݈݋̶ܿ௜ ǡ ݐ௞ሻȁ݅ǡ ݆ǡ ݇ א Ժǡ ݐ௞ ൌ ሾݐ௞ିǡ ݐ௞ାሿሽ
Where ݐ௞ି denotes when the product arrives at this node,ݐ௞ା denotes the time of leaving for the next stop. It is pointed
out that in real daily practice, both ݈݋ܿԢ and ݈݋̶ܿ have multiple
options, therefore both have different values for each epc. 
Data type III: Since data mining on Data type I and II is a 
common business processing, the intermediate results and the 
final results of this processing form another data type, which is 
denoted as Data type III. 
This type of datasets is vulnerable to security threats and 
privacy leakage because there is some hidden connections 
between Data type I and II. To show this, we can look at the 
following simple example. 
Suppose by computing Table I which is completely from 
Data type I dataset, the duration of product 1.2.3.4 in 
12101,12102,12103,12104, and 12105 will be 20hrs, 12hrs 
15min, 34hrs 30min, 229hrs20min, 1075hrs50min. Moreover, 
the statistics of all epcs that passed by these 5 locations can be 
computed, and one of the intermediate results is: “the average 
duration in a shipping port is within the range of 45hrs-62hrs”. 
Meanwhile, in location 12104, by computing statistics of 
the records completely from Data type II, suppose the average 
duration in this location of computing is approximately 50hrs. 
Suppose those results are disclosed and get known by the 
public, in a worst-case when the adversary knows all 
information except the duration of one epc, this value can be 
accurately reconstructed  with the following formula: ݔ௜ ൌ ݊ כ ߤ െ෍ ݔ௝௜ஷ௝
Where n is the sum of the products in this location, ߤ is the
average duration of all products in this location. 
Similarly, with the knowledge discovered by data mining 
from data type I, several nodes can collude to deduce the data 
of the other nodes as competitors. For instance, according to 
statistics of shipping nodes, some shipping nodes can work 
together to inference the related values of the other shipping 
nodes. 
B. System assumptions 
To achieve an enhanced guarantee of security and privacy, 
we need to set up a set of system assumptions. 
• We assume that it is the responsibility of the producer
to guarantee the authenticity of its products and prevent
its brand from corruptions by risk management of
choosing the authenticated the shipping pathways
according to the related laws. Therefore, all partners
along with this supply chain should provide this
producer with the information related to its products
under its queries while keeping the rights of privacy
related to that of other producers.
• We also assume that the communications between each
producer with its partners are based the common PKI
infrastructure. It is reasonable to assume that each
producer should be responsible for the e-pedigree of its
own products; therefore, each of the producers should
maintain and update the key rings of the PKI
infrastructures for the verification of its certificates of
its e-pedigrees.
• Each producer works as a semi-trusted TTP based on
the contracts with its cooperative partners along the
supply chain. It computes the data mining results from
the output of its queries to its partners. The basic
purpose of this data mining process is for exception
detections and verifying the authenticity of its e-
pedigrees, while it also has a tendency to inference the
efficiency of its partners which is the privacy its
partners might be reluctant to disclose. Therefore, while
each partner submits the basic location information of
the product in its encrypted form to its producer, since
the duration information of the product will directly
show some features of the node to the producer, it is
required that while the data in the set keep unvaried, the
order of the data should be randomly decided so that the
producer should be unable to inference by data mining
and disclose the relations of the data with the data
owners.
• Each node has the right to do data mining for improving
its own management and marketing promotions only
based on the data sets stored in its own database, with
assistance of some publicly released data sources from
other nodes. However, since the data of each node are
linked with that of its neighboring nodes, the leakage of
its data will directly be followed with the leakage of
that of its neighboring nodes, and leading to the leakage
of the datasets in the whole chain. Thus, we assume that
for specific node, the knowledge discovered during the
data mining processing should be classified into types:
one type is public, the other is private. For the private
type, the access to the result is strictly restricted and
used only for internal decision support. For the public
type, the results of data mining can be released but the
related privacy preserving strategy must be taken into
considerations.
• Furthermore, we assume that the processing of data
mining by the producers is completely independent of
that data mining by each node in the whole chain. In
practical applications, more often than not, we can
usually observe that while there are obvious links
among the datasets between the producers’ data mining
and their partners’ data mining, there can be some
inconsistence between them due to inconsistent
updating or different processing time. This observation
can strongly justify our assumption. Basically, the result
of any node’s data mining should not depend directly
on any of other node’s results, although there may be
influential factors related to its neighboring nodes only
on that they may show some similarities in some
aspects. For simplicity, we make this assumption.
• We assume the expectations from the public to the
accuracy of the data mining reports for the e-pedigree’s
verifications and the evaluations of the supply chain are
completely different: for the first, the more accurate the
e-pedigree’s verifications, the more authentic the
product, and in return, the more beneficial for the
producers; while for the other, the accuracy of those
published reports is only to show claims from the chain
partners, which can be less trustworthy to the public.
In summary, there are two main roles of two different and 
also independent data mining processes: one is the curator who 
tries to collect the related data sets and learn out the exceptions 
that are most likely referred to counterfeiting activities, so that 
some measures can be taken to reduce the risks that may follow 
up. The other is the promoter who tries to dig out the best side 
of its business activities, so that more opportunities can be 
found by its internal attractions. Both roles are partially 
connected by their internally correlated datasets. We need to 
point out that although producers also dig out to promote their 
products, this behavior is nothing with the supply chain, thus 
not the competing source for any part of the supply chain, 
therefore, we don’t consider it in this study. Therefore, in this 
paper, producers are only considered as the curators, while all 
shipping and distributing parts of the chain are taken as the 
promoters. Both the curator and its related promoters 
communicate with each other under the common PKI 
infrastructure maintained and supported by the specific curator. 
C. Problem formulations 
Now we can formulate our problem as follows. 
System model:  This system is modeled as a distributed 
environment consisting of N databases across the network. In 
this system, there are three types of users: the producers or the 
curators, who start the records of the databases; the distributors 
or the promoters, who update the records of the databases in 
the middle; and the customer, or the buyer, who requires the 
proof of the e-pedigree of the products to be bought. For 
simplicity, we can only pay attention to the first two types of 
users. In general scenarios, one curator has to distribute its 
goods with the assistance of many promoters, and different 
curators will independently manage this one-to-many relations 
based on their collaboration contracts. Thus, we can only take 
one curator and its respective promoters into our considerations. 
Databases in the middle are maintained and updated by the 
respective distributors, as shown in Fig.2. 
Suppose ܿ௜ א  (i=1,2,…,n), n is the total number of the
producers in the supply chain. ݌௜௝ א  (j=1,2,…,m), m is the
total number of the promoters collaborated with ܿ௜. Let ݁݌ܿ௜௞
be product manufactured by ܿ௜ , ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿ , K is the total
number of the products made by ܿ௜ . Then the history of the
records for ݁݌ܿ௜௞,݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿ, can be denoted as a collection of
data sequence, ܦ௜ ؔ ൛൫௜௞ǡ ݌௜௝ ǡ ݐ௜௝൯ȁ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿǡ ݆ א ሾͳǡ݉ሿൟ
Where ݐ௜௝  determines the temporal order of the data
sequence. 
Obviously, we can prove that the pair of (݁݌ܿ௜௞ ǡ ݌௜௝) share
the same temporal order of the data sequence with that of ݐ௜௝.
As previously mentioned, ݐ௜௝  also denotes the entry time
and exit time of the product, therefore, the duration of the 
product in the node can be easily derived, which characterizes 
some part of the node, especially on its operational efficiency 
that this node is reluctant to disclose. 
Problem formulation I: is there a secure way that ܿ௜  can
collect ܦ௜, without losing the information of its temporal order,
but keeping the order of  ݐ௜௝ as a secret to ܿ௜?
Let ௦݂ be a scrambling function that can scramble the order
of  ݐ௜௝, then we have,ܦכ௜ ൌ ௦݂ሺܦ௜ሻ ൌ ௦݂൫൛൫௜௞ǡ ݌௜௝ ǡ ݐ௜௝൯ȁ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿǡ ݆ א ሾͳǡ݉ሿൟ൯ ൌ൛൫௜௞ǡ ݌௜௝ ǡ ௦݂ሺݐ௜௝ሻ൯ȁ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿǡ ݆ א ሾͳǡ݉ሿൟ
Therefore the critical part of the solution to problem I is to 
find a reasonable scrambling function that can meet the 
requirements of the related privacy preserving and security. 
Similarly, for specific ݌௜௝ א  (j=1,2,…,m), the history of
the records for ݁݌ܿ௜௞ ,݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿ from different producers or
curators  ܿ௜ א  (i=1,2,…,n) can be collected automatically and
stored in its database, which can be denoted as, 
ܦ௝ ؔ ൛൫௜௞ǡ ݌௜௝ ǡ ݐ௜௝൯ȁ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿǡ ݅ א ሾͳǡ ݊ሿൟ
Where i=1,2,…,n and acts as the pointer to its related 
producer ܿ௜.
Most of the knowledge discovered by data mining from 
datasets of this type in a specific node is related to statistics of 
its neighboring relations, which will be kept as the secret of 
this company. However, there are some statistics of this node 
such as some sums of the product counts from some producers, 
which might become part of the auxiliary information for the 
adversary to guess out the related sensitive data just as we have 
mentioned previously. 
Problem formulation II: is there a secure way that ݌௜௝ can
collect ܦ௝, and do its data mining, but keeping the privacy of
the statistics of the sum of counts from queries of the databases? 
Let ௣݂ be a perturbing function that can add noise of some
random distributions to the respective results, then we have, ෍ܦכ௜ ൌ෍ ௣݂ሺܦ௜ሻൌ෍ ௣݂൫൛൫௜௞ ǡ ݌௜௝ ǡ ݐ௜௝൯ȁ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿǡ ݆ א ሾͳǡ݉ሿൟ൯ൌ ቊቆ ௣݂ ቀ෍௜௞ቁ ǡ ௣݂ ቀ෍݌௜௝ቁ ǡ ௣݂ ቀ෍ݐ௜௝ቁቇ ȁ݇ א ሾͳǡ ܭሿǡ݆ א ሾͳǡ݉ሿቋ
The most important part of problem II requires that while 
the outcome of the data mining is perturbed by some random 
noises, the utility must be preserved to prevent it from being 
useless. 
Design goals: Specifically for the security and privacy of 
the data mining activities, several design goals must be defined 
in advance. 
• Confidentiality: The data that each node submits to the
curator for the verification of e-pedigree should be kept
unknown to the other nodes. The curator, however,
should also be restricted with its access to the data
which might be related to partial business secret of
those distributors.
• Integrity: Since data tampering is a very important way
of counterfeiting, data exchange between the curator
and those distributors should be kept intact.
• Availability: We assume that each node has its special
data center to ensure its data availability, and the related
access control strategies, which will not be discussed in
this paper.
• Non-repudiation: Each party of the supply chain is not
wholly trustable, thus some cryptographically based
methods such as the digital certificate should be used to
address this issue. This is usually accompanied with the
process of verifying the e-pedigrees.
• Privacy preserving: The most innovative part of our
system is its privacy preserving design of data mining
processing. There are two different types of problem
formulations. For problem I, not only the security issues 
of multiparty data exchange should be taken into 
considerations, but also the privacy related to some of 
the data should be kept intact, leading to a complicated 
situation of combining the secure multiparty computing 
with privacy preserving. For problem II, while most of 
the output of the data mining results should be kept in 
secret for administrative decision making under the 
role-based access policy, some of the data publically 
released for marketing promotion must take its privacy 
into considerations, especially for those eligible for 
deducting the sensitive information of its partners as 
auxiliary information. 
Threat model: The widely accepted semi-honest adversary 
model [21] will be used in our system. In this adversary model, 
all parties, even corrupted ones, follow the protocol honestly to 
obtain their “legal verifications” through the system, but the 
adversary will try to obtain the unauthorized data by exploiting 
the vulnerabilities of the system such as data mining. An 
adversary is adaptive if it is able to choose the specific parties 
to corrupt during the computation, rather than having a fixed 
set of corrupted parties. 
An adversary can be either the miner or a database analyzer, 
who will try to learn both the accurate statistics of its own 
database and the statistics of sum of counts from all other 
databases if available. 
D. Our contributions 
In this paper, we focus our attentions on data mining of 
databases of a sequence of datasets, where the data records of 
one database has internally temporal and spatial relations with 
another, while guaranteeing the security and privacy of those 
databases. In comparison with conventional schemes, our 
system has the following contributions: 
Trade-off between privacy and utility: In a secure 
multiparty computing environment, the privacy of each party is 
fully taken into considerations by choosing some scrambling or 
perturbing functions. The parameters for trade-off between 
privacy and utility are not only dependent on the databases but 
also on the situations to be considered. It shows that our system 
has much better adaptability. 
Universality: To our best knowledge, most of current 
works dealing with similar issues in very restricted scenarios 
such as queries of statistical databases with independent data or 
at most limited correlations between those data which are 
previously fixed before queried. However, in a typical supply 
chain, those data are correlated with each other and build up 
dynamically a special data sequence. Obviously, leakage of 
any part of the data chain will result in the compromise of the 
whole chain. Therefore, new algorithms must be proposed to 
address this issue. 
Attributes based access control (ABAC): As mentioned 
above, supply chain databases have some unique features, one 
of which is that, different data attribute may play different role 
in the privacy preserving process under the different 
requirement of the roles such as the data miners and the 
promoters. In our system, these factors have been carefully 
considered, and new access control mechanisms are proposed 
to adapt to this goal. 
IV. OUR PROPOSED SYSTEM
A. Our proposed system 
In general, the basic way to design such a system is to set 
up a trust boundary with security policies(SP) or mechanism to 
protect the databases, so that we can ensure that the data miner 
will neither disclose the sensitive data nor leave some of the 
databases unprotected, as shown in Fig.5. 
Fig. 5. General security model for data mining of databases 
Therefore, the key part of the system design is the security 
mechanism that includes security policies, methods and rules 
of access control. The basic attribute-based access control 
method discussed in [22] will be used in our system, the model 
structure of which is shown in Fig.6. 
Fig. 6. Unified ABAC model structure, adapted from [22] 
In our proposed system, there are mainly two kinds of users, 
one is the curator, and the other is the internal users of this 
chain node.  
For different users (U) with different attributes (UA), some 
constrains on its related subjects (S) and objects (O) can be 
determined when it is created in its initialization phase. 
Based on this model structure, we can further determine the 
security policies for the related queries and functions to process 
the datasets. The basic architecture of our proposed system is 
shown in Fig.7. 
Trust 
boundary 
Data 
miner 
SP 
DB 
Fig. 7. The basic architecture of our proposed system 
From Fig.7, each user is connected with a series of rules 
(i.e. protocols to get those data ready for queries of its user) 
and security policies (i.e. the strategies that tells how the data 
should be processed) based on its attributes and constraints, 
which can select the appropriate functions to map the raw 
databases to the related datasets and process the data to the 
form that can meet our security and privacy requirements. 
B. Key issues of its implementation 
The core of the “data processing” modular in Fig.7 attempts 
to process the datasets according to the rules and the security 
policies for specific users. There are chiefly two types of data 
processing in our system: one is the random distributions of 
temporal dataset based on a secure multiparty computing 
protocol (TDSMUP), and the other is noise perturbation of the 
dataset based on differential privacy (NPDDP). 
TDSMUP algorithm: we draft this algorithm as a secure 
multiparty computing protocol by re-designing Mishra’s EER 
algorithm [13]. 
Inputs: ଵܲǡ ଶܲǡ ڮ ǡ ୬ܲ as parties; D as function pool;ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ڮ ǡ ୫݂ as encrypting functions;ܭ݁ݕ௣௨௕ǡ ܭ݁ݕ௣௥௜ as the PKI key pair of the curator;ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௨௕ǡ ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௥௜ as the PKI key pair of  ௜ܲ;௙ܴ  as a randomization function
Initialization: 
for party ଵܲto ୬ܲ , do
Break data block into packets for ௜ܲ :ሺ ௜ܲܭଵǡ ௜ܲܭଶǡ ڮ ǡ ௜ܲܭ௥ሻ
for the curator, do 
Generate a random vector with ௙ܴ: ܰ ൌ ሺݎଵǡ ݎଶǡ ڮ ǡ ݎ௡ሻ.
Select ௞݂ from D by letting݇ ൌ ݎ௝,
Encrypt (ݎ௝ ǡ ௞݂) with ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௨௕, send ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௨௕ (ݎ௝ ǡ ௞݂) to ௜ܲ. ௜ܲ:
Decrypt ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௨௕ (ݎ௝ ǡ ௞݂) with ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௥௜;
Encrypt ௜ܲܭ௥ with ௞݂ , i.e. ௥ܸ ൌ ௝݂ሺ ௜ܲܭ௥ሻ;
Encrypt ( ௥ܸ ǡ ݎ௝) with ܭ݁ݕ௣௨௕;
Send ܭ݁ݕ௣௨௕ሺ ௥ܸ ǡ ݎ௝ሻ to the curator.
The curator: 
Decrypt ܭ݁ݕ௣௨௕ ( ௥ܸ ǡ ݎ௝) with ܭ݁ݕ௣௥௜;
Decrypt ௥ܸ with  ௞݂ from D by letting݇ ൌ ݎ௝;
Re-assemble ௜ܲܭ௥ back to its original data block.
NPDDP algorithm: this algorithm is specially designed for 
those statistical queries that can be used for knowledge 
discovery of statistics in marketing promotion use, where we 
assume that removal or addition of any one of the records 
should not affect the outcome of the queries, therefore the 
privacy of particular sensitive data could be preserved this way. 
In our system, we choose to use the Laplacian mechanism, and 
the parameters that determine the Laplace distribution will be 
computed according to the results published in [23]. 
Inputs: E as the essential cost; B as the budget; Į as the
required accuracy and T as the required error threshold; ܦ ൌሼܦ଴ǡ ܦଵǡ ڮ ǡ ܦ௡ሽ as the data sets.
Step 1:  Compute number of records that can meet the 
requirement of privacy preserving N, such that  ൌ ͳʹଶ  Ƚ͵
Step 2:  Compare N with the actual counts of records N’, if 
N൏N’, then halt, giving the message of privacy warning.
Step 3: Otherwise, Compute t1 and t2 such that ͳ ൌ ͸Ǣ ʹ ൌ  ൬ͳ ൅ ൰Ǥ
Step4:  Choose İ=min{t1,t2}.
Step 5:  Compute the noise of Laplace distribution such that ො ൌ െɂሺሻሺͳ െ ʹȁȁሻ
Where U is a random variable of uniform distribution 
within the intervalቂെ ୒ᇱଶ ǡ ୒ᇱଶ ቃ.
Step 6: add ො to the output data.
Step 7: Return ܦԢ ൌ ሼܦԢ଴ǡ ܦԢଵǡ ڮ ǡ ܦԢ௡ሽ
C. Theoretical analysis 
For TDSMUP algorithm, it is easy to prove that any other 
parties are unable to know the data sent to  ௜ܲ  because it is
encrypted with ܭ݁ݕ௜௣௨௕ , which can only be decrypted withܭ݁ݕ௜௣௥௜, the private key of  ௜ܲ. Similarly, any other parties are
unable to know the data sent to the curator by eavesdropping 
because it is encrypted with ܭ݁ݕ௣௨௕ which can be decrypted
only with ܭ݁ݕ௣௥௜, the private key of the curator.
Furthermore, we also can prove that the curator should be 
unable to distinguish the source of the data, therefore having 
the privacy of the data preserved. The reason is, the curator 
randomly selects the encryption functions with the index and 
send to the respective parties in a temporal order, the curator 
itself is not permitted to remember this random numbers. In 
consequence, the curator can re-assemble the data blocks just 
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with the random numbers, losing the information of their 
temporal order, i.e. the source of the data. 
For NPDDP algorithm based on the principle of differential 
privacy, it can be easily proved as in [23] that the privacy of 
the data can be well preserved within the range of the required 
accuracy and perturbed error. 
Therefore, our design goals are achieved. However, in this 
algorithm, there are places that need to be improved. (1) It is 
simply assumed that the number of functions for encryption is 
no less than that of the parties, which might be untrue in 
practical applications. (2)  What if the curator remembers the 
random numbers since it is semi-trusted? 
Although there are some seemingly simple ways to get 
these problems solved, there are also some other factors to be 
considered to have the system easily maintained. We leave 
them to be studied in the near future. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In scenarios of a complicated RFID-enabled product supply 
chain, the e-pedigree of the product plays a very important role 
in verifying the authenticity of the product, thus reducing 
greatly the risk of faked products. However, since the data of 
the e-pedigree is essentially a set of a temporal sequence which 
is correlated with each other, the publishing or release of their 
data mining results might cause severe leakage of the privacy, 
leading to the complete compromise of the whole supply chain. 
Therefore, the security and privacy of this kind of data turn out 
to be a very challenging issue in this field. 
To address this issue, we proposed a system that combines 
the secure multi-party computing with the differential privacy 
techniques on the basis of the attribute based access control 
mechanism of the databases distributed along the supply chain, 
achieving a better trade-off between the privacy and utility 
with a better universality. 
Although our proposed algorithms look well fitted for our 
preset requirements, we also noticed that some problems still 
exist such as the curator might remember the random numbers 
and disclose the privacy of the related parties, which will leave 
just for future research. 
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